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MURDER ON ISLE AU HAUT: 
VIOLENCE AND JEFFERSON’S 
EMBARGO IN COASTAL MAINE,
1807-1809
By J o s h u a  M. S m i t h
Maine's early nineteenth-century smugglers also capture the atten­
tion of Joshua Smith. In his study o f the events surrounding the Isle 
an Hunt murder o f a customhouse officer with the improbable name 
of Lazaro Bogdomovitch, Smith finds, like Alan Taylor, that Maine 
communities both overtly and covertly resisted the imposition o f laws 
inimical to their economic well-being. Joshua Smith is a Ph.D. candi­
date at the University o f Maine, where he is completing a dissertation 
entitled uThe Rogues o f yQnoddy: Smuggling in the Maine-New 
Brunswick Borderlands, 1783-1820
Mu r d e r  on a remote Maine island one dark and stormy night would seem to be the stuff of novels, but the real life events surrounding the murder of a federal customhouse officer on 
Isle au Haut ultimately proved far stranger than any tale concocted by a 
mystery writer. In November 1808, smugglers murdered a customs 
guard named Lazaro Bogdomovitch on Isle au Haut and cast his body 
adrift. Officials captured and jailed the perpetrators after a harrowing 
sea chase, but a mob of men disguised as women attacked the jail and re­
leased most of the prisoners. At the ensuing trial the court was forced to 
let the remaining prisoners go free because no witnesses would come 
forward. The federal court system finally apprehended two suspects and 
tried them, but one escaped and lived in exile for the rest of his life, and 
the other languished in prison until a drunken sailor murdered him in 
1815.
This series of events, with all its twists and turns, raises many ques­
tions. Who was Lazaro Bogdomovitch, and why did smugglers murder 
him? Why did witnesses refuse to come forward to identify his murder­
ers? What does this murder and the events surrounding it tell us about 
Penobscot Bay or about smuggling in the early nineteenth century? The 
answers have been difficult to find. Bogdomovitch was a foreigner with­
out family, whose corpse was buried in an unmarked grave somewhere
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in Castine.1 The unwillingness of witnesses to come forward, too, re­
mains a mystery. Local histories do not mention the incident, and, to this 
day, some people on Isle au Haut insist that no murder has ever occurred 
there.2 Yet court records, government reports, newspaper accounts, and 
the letter of a son whose father died in the incident verify that smugglers 
murdered a man named Bogdomovitch on Isle au Haut in the fall of 
1808.3 The historical amnesia about Bagdomovitch's murder suggests 
that the incident was not merely forgotten but actively and purposefully 
obscured, omitted from the public memory because it reflected badly on 
the community as a whole. What then was the significance of these 
events to Penobscot Bay communities? Bagdomovitch's murder reveals 
that political and economic tensions tore coastal Maine communities 
apart in the early nineteenth century. The key issue in this conflict was 
the role of government in regulating seaborne commerce. Ultimately 
Bogdomovitch s murder resulted from hostilities emerging from a single 
question: Did the coastal populace have a right to trade overseas and to 
fish coastal waters without governmental interference?
Conflict over government regulation of maritime trade in Maine's 
coastal communities parallels the often violent disputes erupting be­
tween absentee landowners and agrarian squatters in Maine's inland 
communities. The similarities are in fact quite stunning. Less than a year 
after the Isle au Haut murder an armed group of squatters in Malta 
(modern Windsor) attacked and killed a land surveyor named Paul 
Chadwick. A failed jailbreak followed, and the jury refused to convict the 
accused murderers. In both instances, public sentiment supported the 
accused, resulting in their release. The squatters murdered Chadwick be­
cause they believed that they possessed rights to farmland superseding 
the rights of landed proprietors and state law. Similarly, on Isle au Haut 
smugglers believed they had a right to pursue maritime trade despite 
federal laws to the contrary. Questions about the pursuit of economic 
happiness, it would seem, divided Maine communities to the point 
where murder became an option partially sanctioned by the community.
While the Isle au Haut murder has remained obscure, the Malta inci­
dent recently received attention in Alan Taylor's study of agrarian resist­
ance in Maine, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors. Taylor found that 
Maine's squatters presumed that they had a right to low-priced land in 
the aftermath of the American Revolution and bitterly resented the land 
speculation of men such as Henry Knox. The squatter resistance was ini­
tially a community-based effort framed in terms of morality, but, even­
tually, it found a stronger voice in the form of party politics. The Penob­
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scot Bay smugglers used methods very similar to those of agrarian squat­
ters to defend their right to engage in maritime pursuits.1
While Maine’s squatters resisted the pressure of landed proprietors to 
eject them from their hardscrabble farms, coastal smugglers objected to 
the control of federal customs officers. The proprietors’ skillful manipu­
lation of the legal system to force squatters off disputed lands produced a 
simmering conflict. Squatters disguised as “White Indians” harassed 
deputy sheriffs and surveyors, usually through intimidation rather than 
actual use of force. Smugglers, too, organized a collective resistance that 
emphasized stealth and intimidation over actual violence. Unlike the 
agrarian protests, however, smugglers first attempted to use political 
means to resolve the conflict. When those efforts failed, coastal residents 
resorted to similar methods of popular violence used by squatters.
Resistance to federal trade regulations differs from agrarian resistance 
in another important aspect: the precipitate speed with which New Eng­
land’s maritime communities turned against the federal government. 
While the squatter resistance predated the American Revolution, mar­
itime communities generally ranked among the staunchest supporters of 
the federal government after 1789. Port communities benefited from
Woodcut of smugglers from a children’s book entitled The Book of Commerce 
by Sea or Land (Philadelphia: Uriah Hunt, 1837).
federal trade policies that provided generous tariff breaks to American 
merchants, gave cod bounties for fishermen, protected American ship­
ping with a navy, and built lighthouses at the mouths of harbors. The 
complacency with which Maine port communities regarded the federal 
government quickly gave way to horror, however, when President 
Thomas Jefferson attempted to halt overseas trade completely in an ef­
fort to punish European powers for their transgressions against Ameri­
can shipping and mariners in his infamous embargo of 1807-1809.
Historians have not done a very good job of unpacking the embargo’s 
meaning for nineteenth-century Americans. Local historians often dwell 
on the collapse of great fortunes and resultant suicides of previously 
prosperous merchants. Political historians have concentrated on the po­
litical consequences of the embargo, debating its effectiveness and im­
portance at the national level. Maritime historians inevitably lament the 
embargo as a tragedy while biographers of Thomas Jefferson have both 
lauded and vilified him for his policies. But there exists no full-length 
analysis of the embargo’s political, economic, and social effects. This is 
unfortunate, for the embargo can tell us a great deal about ordinary peo­
ple’s vision of the new republic’s economic future.5
Maine’s Penobscot Bay region offers an ideal laboratory in which to 
analyze the embargo’s effects. According to more than one observer, no 
section of the nation was harder hit by the embargo than Maine. 
Although communities all along the eastern seaboard faced economic 
crisis, Maine’s reliance on the production and export of staples such as 
timber or fish made it somewhat of an oddity in the United States." 
Maine struggled more than other maritime regions under the embargo 
restrictions because it could not produce its own food, especially flour. 
Halting international commerce, the coasting trade, and fishing, the em­
bargo devastated all social classes, not least of all because food (and 
credit to buy provisions) became scarce. In Hancock County there were 
complaints of starvation and threats of violence by woodsmen who 
could not procure credit to buy flour for their hungry families. Coastal 
Maine’s almost exclusive reliance on seaborne commerce explains both 
the resistance to trade restrictions and, perhaps, the period’s inland un­
rest. The squatters who so fiercely resisted landed proprietors and their 
surveyors in the woods may have been driven to desperation by the eco­
nomic impact of Jefferson’s embargo. Not only were timber prices deci­
mated, but coastal merchants could not afford to offer inland customers 
credit to buy provisions.7
Episodes of resistance to the embargo are one measure of the policy’s
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impact. The federal customs collectors stationed in various ports bore 
the brunt of enforcing the embargo laws. In the Penobscot district active 
resistance culminated in the murder of customs guard Lazaro Bogdo- 
movitch. Through it all the local customs collector, Josiah Hook of Cas- 
tine, stood firm in his enforcement of the unpopular laws. His particu­
larly intransigent approach brought about a correspondingly violent 
reaction from Penobscot Bay communities and resulted in crowd actions 
against him and his followers."
The overall impression of this collective violence and intimidation is 
not one of a mob out of control but quite the reverse. Restraint seems to 
have ruled most popular reactions to the embargo. Resisters preferred 
threats and intimidation over actual violence. Crowd actions were not 
aimed at removing the customs collectors but, rather, at bringing them 
within a societal norm. When the community gathered to express its 
outrage over the embargo, it singled out the collectors and their assis­
tants as violators of a perceived right to engage in marine commerce and 
fishing. By coming together, the crowd developed a tighter bond of soli­
darity, reaffirmed their commercial rights, and singled out the collectors 
as “deviants.” In so doing, they firmly established a boundary between 
right and wrong, deviant and conformist. These boundaries were moral 
in nature; the collective established a favorable identity for itself and an 
unfavorable one for the offender."
Coastal communities began to deem customs officers as deviants 
when, in pursuit of smugglers, the federal officials turned to question­
able shows of armed force. This occurred as early as June 1808. An in­
formant in Buckstown (modern Bucksport) on the Penobscot River told 
the local customs collector that four hogsheads of rum had been smug­
gled and concealed in town. Hook soon arrived “full of consequence and 
bustle, breathing threats, penalties, and confiscations.” While searching 
the waterfront for rum, the collector saw three men in a wherry-boat 
rowing across the river with a barrel clearly visible between them. Sus­
pecting evasion of the embargo laws, the collector ordered the boat to re­
turn. The men ignored the order and continued to row for the opposite 
shore. The enraged collector had an assistant fetch him a loaded musket 
and threatened to fire on the boat. The men did not respond but, in­
stead, threw the supposed contraband into the water. The barrel, as it 
turns out, was completely empty and floated high in the water. An em­
barrassed Collector Hook soon departed Buckstown in high dudgeon. 
The local newspaper mocked the collector asking, “Shall the free citizens 
of this country have their lives endangered by every petty officer of the
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customs, and be at the hazard of having their brains blown out every 
time they cross the river with a hogshead or barrel?” It was a gentle chid­
ing, a part of the collector's continuing education in standards of behav­
ior acceptable to the community. Later lessons were not to be so mild.10
Buckstown and other ports reacted collectively to the embargo. The 
community, almost as a whole, undermined Hook's efforts to prosecute 
embargo violators. Witnesses refused to appear at court, and juries re­
fused to give guilty verdicts in smuggling cases. Buckstown's merchants, 
who had supported the uniform admiralty law offered by the federal 
government before the embargo, quickly reverted to a popular sense of 
law when free trade was threatened.” This communal resistance frus­
trated the collector immensely. It also frustrated President Jefferson, who 
initiated a series of punitive measures against the town. Jefferson did not 
aim these restrictions at individual Buckstown citizens but at the com­
munity as a whole because of the town's “general spirit of disobedience.” 
If Buckstown and other towns were going to resist the embargo as a 
united society, then the executive branch would reciprocate, and punish 
them accordingly.12 The local press saw Jefferson's reaction to resistance 
in Buckstown as a form of oppression equivalent with the infamous 
Boston Port Act of 1774, reminding readers that they were heirs to a tra­
dition of Revolutionary resistance.13
The commercial orientation of Maine's coastal communities enabled 
them to present a largely united front against the embargo. Sociological 
studies of New England merchants suggest that they possessed commu­
nal values emphasizing consensus and friendship and that merchants os­
tracized individuals who deviated from that unity. This strong sense of 
community, combined with appeals to higher authority for relief, peace­
ful resistance of authority, and ritualized collective violence, suggests 
that the coastal populace may have been practicing a form of “moral 
economy.”14
No discussion of moral economy is complete without a consideration 
of E. P. Thompson's work on that subject. Thompson found that work­
ing people in eighteenth-century England had devised a means of resist­
ing the market economy when it threatened their access to food. 
Thompson defined this process as “a consistent traditional view of social 
norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several par­
ties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to consti­
tute the moral economy of the poor.” He very carefully, however, states 
that this does not mean that working people had an inherent moral su­
periority. He uses the term moral to indicate that they possessed a set of
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expectations based on patriarchal obligations. Nor does he attack the 
market economy as immoral but, rather, points out that rioters were 
themselves deeply involved in the market economy. Other British schol­
ars have since refined the concept, indicating that, when times were 
tough, communities reacted with an ethos of self-help that drew loosely 
on memories of traditional forms of resistance.15
American historians have developed their own theories of moral 
economy, always with reference to Thompson’s 1971 groundbreaking ar­
ticle on the subject. The most famous example is Gary Nash’s considera­
tion of Boston food markets in The Urban Crucible. Barbara Clark Smith 
picked up on the theme of the moral economy of provision in her study 
of food rioters and found that American communities during and long 
after the Revolutionary period possessed “standards of obligation among 
neighbors” that linked moral and economic matters.10 American histori­
ans also moved beyond the bread nexus, however. Ruth Bogin’s “Peti­
tioning and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary America” 
argues that many petitioners of the period were “working to transform 
the traditional ‘moral economy’ into a defense of personal independence 
and moderate opportunity against perpetual exploitation and the threat 
of impoverishment by those who held the political reins.” Bogin found 
that, in times of crisis, middling level individuals joined the poor in en­
forcing a moral economy, which expanded into a republican view of 
equality. According to Bogin, the food nexus in America was less impor­
tant than the “land nexus”: debt and taxes also created popular reactions. 
Many petitions expressed the grievances of poor Americans after the 
Revolution with “plain words and a direct assertiveness.” The signifi­
cance of these petitions was that they actively sought government inter­
vention in the economy to create a “more just society” but this did not 
mean that petitioners rejected capitalism. Bogin’s definition fits neatly 
with what inland Maine settlers sought from the landed proprietors.17
Moral economy has taken on many different meanings in different 
contexts, but historians agree on a set of distinctive characteristics. First, 
a common denominator of moral economy is a community’s perception 
that an abuse of moral conventions regarding economics had occurred. 
Often this meant the price of bread, but it might be conflict over land 
ownership, or other events that threatened the good not only of individ­
uals but the community or region as a whole. Second, collective violence, 
or its threat, were structured events in which participants only reluc­
tantly resorted to bloodshed. Petitions or warnings usually preceded di­
rect actions, which often possessed their own ritualized proceedings.
Whether legal or extralegal, community members thought that their ac­
tions represented a prior obligation to aid weaker members of the com­
munity. Third, the people involved in extralegal activities expected sym­
pathy from the community and officialdom. Magistrates, soldiers, and 
others often chose to ignore, acquiesce to, or even participate in petitions 
and crowd actions. Finally, these attempts at economic correction were 
made at a local or regional level and might be to the detriment of the 
government's political economy, or to the nation as a whole.18
Applying the concepts of moral economy to coastal Maine provides a 
model that allows a greater understanding of resistance to Jefferson's 
embargo. Maine's ports and harbors were dedicated to a market econ­
omy, but this does not exclude the possibility that they acted under the 
terms of a moral economy as well. E. P. Thompson himself conceded the 
idea that fishing communities could adhere to a moral economy. Other 
scholars have gone a step further by suggesting that pirates took part in a 
marine moral economy and that sailors espoused a form of egalitarian­
ism when they leaped into shoreside tumults.14
The waterfront had always been a rough area of America ports and 
also a place where sailors and other workers intruded into the political 
world. One need only think of the many affrays on Boston's waterfront 
before the American Revolution. Yet, the political thinkers of the day 
were hesitant to recognize the value of mariners and others to the young 
republic. Thomas Jefferson stands out as a politician who failed to un­
derstand the nature of maritime communities. Jefferson believed in a re­
public based upon independent “yeoman farmers.'' Merchants, sailors, 
shipbuilders, and fishermen were inherently inferior because they did 
not possess the self-reliance that Jefferson believed farmers possessed. 
The marine community, however, was not to be dismissed lightly, and it 
tormented Jefferson throughout his final year in office.20
Mariners dominated Maine's crowd actions during the embargo and 
the crowning achievement of these riots was to sail away with a cargo. 
While many fled to the Maritime Provinces, however, others were left 
unemployed and penniless in port: a combination that was extremely 
conducive to mischief. Lumbermen enjoyed a reputation scarcely less 
boisterous than that of seamen, and, with markets denied the fruit of 
their labor, they too were idled. Fishermen also found themselves unem­
ployed as the successive embargo laws made it virtually impossible for a 
fishing vessel to put to sea. These workers stood near the bottom of New 
England society, and they were the ones who formed the core of resist­
ance to the embargo. But, as the effects of the embargo impoverished ar­
tisans and merchants, they joined sailors and fishermen, reinforcing the
24 Maine History
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unity of the community in antipathy against the commercial restric­
tions. The lower orders welcomed the leadership of merchants and sea 
captains because it legitimized their grievances.21
Coastal New England did not subscribe to the notion that “commerce 
corrupts ” Nor did Massachusetts Federalists entirely embrace the eco­
nomic liberalism of Adam Smith. Ideas of deference remained strong in 
coastal Massachusetts until after the War of 1812, and those ideas were 
often regarded as reciprocal in nature. Paternalism remained a force that 
united society against external threats. New England society thus re­
mained bound by traditional obligations within a community, even as it 
increasingly moved towards a market economy. While members of the 
community were encouraged to prosper, doing so at the expense of oth­
ers was frowned upon, and persons who profited unjustly at the expense 
of the community could be the targets of the crowd's wrath. Custom­
house officers were often perceived as just such individuals because they 
received a fifty percent share of the proceeds of any contraband auc­
tioned by the government. Federal laws also allowed informers lucrative 
incentives and, as a result, mobs often targeted informers. A crowd 
tarred and feathered one unfortunate informer in Portland in October 
1808.22
Maine communities protested the morality of the embargo on two 
principles. First, coastal residents believed they possessed a right to wrest 
a living from the sea. In petition after petition to President Jefferson, 
Maine towns pointed to their reliance on the sea for their livelihoods and 
the impossibility of pursuing agriculture. Opponents of the embargo in­
terpreted the complete and seemingly perpetual denial of the right to 
navigate as an infringement of their constitutional right to enjoy the use 
of their property. There was also some feeling that the federal govern­
ment had stepped beyond its powers to regulate interstate trade by deny­
ing vessels the right to proceed from one port to another within the same 
state. When these communities found themselves very suddenly impov­
erished in the midst of a spectacular shipping boom, they soon began to 
draw moral conclusions about the originators of the laws that denied 
them their economic rights. The Republicans of Massachusetts and 
Maine suffered a huge setback in the polls in the aftermath of the em­
bargo and again when the federal government curtailed trade during the 
War of 1812.23
The second moral issue raised by those opposed to the embargo was 
the enforcement of the various embargo acts. By the end of the embargo, 
customs officials were empowered to search stores and warehouses with­
out a warrant, a privilege they had previously enjoyed only on ship­
board. Collectors were also empowered to call out state militia without 
the governor’s approval and to call on the navy and army as well. Oppo­
nents objected to the enforcement of laws at bayonet point, and odious 
comparisons were made to the British occupation of Boston in the 
1770s.24
The most obvious manifestation of the embargo’s oppression was the 
arming of customs officials. Before the embargo, customs officials were 
unarmed, as were revenue cutters. By the summer of 1808, however, cus­
toms officials had heavily armed themselves. In the Penobscot district 
Collector Hook mounted swivel guns on a sloop and supplied his men 
with muskets. Customhouse officers, on at least one occasion, irked 
Buckstown residents by firing a salute after a successful raid on a ware­
house full of contraband rum. Not only were muskets and swivel guns 
fired, but the federal officers gave a hearty cheer for “Jefferson, rum, and 
embargo!” The presence of so much weaponry in the hands of those op­
posed to the community caused alarm all along the coast.25
Resistance was at first legal and peaceful in nature. Town meetings 
protested the embargo in petitions to President Jefferson. When this tac­
tic failed, towns turned to the Massachusetts General Court, describing 
their fears in vivid language. The petitions of the port towns surround­
ing Penobscot Bay were especially strident in tone. Camden warned that 
that the embargo “cannot be carried into effect in this part of the coun­
try, except by military force, and we dread the consequences that may en­
sue from fire arms being put into the hands of unprincipled men, acting 
under the authority of the officers of government against the united and 
deliberate sentiments of the most respectable part of our citizens.” 
Belfast resolved that every person who aided in the enforcement of the 
embargo was an enemy to liberty and the Constitution. Buckstown de­
clared that President Jefferson possessed a “contemptible and wicked” 
policy toward the commercial states and further condemned customs of­
ficers as “enemies to their country.”2'"
Another method of resisting the embargo among Penobscot Bay 
towns was a poison pen campaign against Collector Hook. In June 1808, 
Hook received an official reprimand for his lack of vigilance in suppress­
ing smuggling. Collector Hook was astonished; he claimed that no col­
lector had been more vigilant in enforcing the embargo than himself and 
that he had risked his life in enforcing the laws. Collector Hook was 
right. While other customs collectors resigned their offices rather than 
enforce the unpopular law, turned a blind eye to violations, or even 
openly colluded with smugglers, Hook remained firm. On at least one
26 Maine History
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occasion Hook even sent an armed boat to help customs officials on 
Mount Desert Island, well outside of his own district. The complaints re­
ceived by the Treasury Department about Hook's lack of vigilance 
should be taken with a grain of salt: no doubt they were written by indi­
viduals who wanted Hook removed for exactly the opposite reason.27
Resistance soon turned to direct action. While some feared taking this 
course, the more desperate or bold mounted a campaign that soon 
showed how ineffective the embargo was. As early as April, two vessels 
loaded with fish allegedly parted their lines in a gale and sailed illegally 
from Buckstown. In June, the United States Navy was informed that 
smugglers were lightering illicit cargoes off Deer Isle and dispatched USS 
Wasp to investigate. In late August, a sloop loaded with flour owned by a 
Republican slipped out of Belfast. Clearly the community consensus had 
grown to the point that it absorbed those who politically should have 
supported the President's policy. Despite increasingly strict laws, vessels 
continued to escape from the Penobscot district in the fall and winter. 
Two schooners in September, two vessels in November, and at least ten in 
January evaded the local revenue cutter and customhouse agents. Nor 
were these events solitary, desperate measures: they might involve as 
many as sixty men. On at least two occasions, customs officers were as­
saulted while attempting to prevent vessels from sailing contrary to the 
law.28
These crowd actions followed a pattern. They were not random acts 
of violence but the attainment of select extralegal goals by the crowd. 
Charles Tilly, in From Mobilization to Revolution recognized five stages 
that lead to collective violence: interests, organization, mobilization, op­
portunity, and collective action. The disturbances of the Penobscot dis­
trict follow this pattern. Communities in the area clearly stated their re­
liance on a maritime economy in letters to the President. The port towns 
rallied around a unifying structure, the morality of their cause, and the 
apparent immorality of those deviating from it, resulting in greater or­
ganization. Once aware of their interests and organization, the commu­
nities mobilized into preparations for direct action. When an opportu­
nity presented itself, be it a covering storm, or absence of custom 
officials, the crowd moved to collective action. The process was not nec­
essarily quick— it was ten months before violence became a serious 
problem in the Penobscot district— but, as it progressed, the process 
strengthened, gaining support from more of the community as the ef­
fects of the embargo became unendurable.29
The escalation of violence and desperation of the coastal communi-
ties called for more radical actions on the part of those who violated the 
embargo laws. The pinnacle of resistance to the embargo occurred late in 
1808 and early in 1809. In November 1808, Buckstown merchants deter­
mined to repossess a cargo of flour and rice impounded on Isle au Haut, 
a remote island fishing community on the fringe of Penobscot Bay They 
used the schooner Peggy, a vessel from Liverpool, Nova Scotia but with 
Eastport, Maine, painted on her stern as a ruse. Both local and foreign 
sailors manned the Peggy, with the intention of rescuing the contraband. 
The crew armed themselves with muskets, cutlasses, blunderbusses, and 
boarding pikes. On Sunday, November 6, a “dark and stormy night,” at 
about seven o'clock the Peggy arrived in Kimball’s Harbor on Isle au 
Haut (present-day Isle au Haut Thoroughfare) and came to anchor. A 
boat loaded with ten armed men put off from the schooner and ap­
proached the dock on which five customs officers guarded the contra­
band load of foodstuffs. A customhouse officer named Wilson hailed the 
boat; when the smugglers replied that they were from nearby Vinal- 
haven, he ordered them to row ashore. Immediately the boat approached 
the officer on the beach, and men sprang from it. With guns cocked, the 
smugglers took Wilson prisoner and put him in the bow of the boat.
The following sequence of events is not clear, but it seems that the 
smugglers rushed the remaining officers on the dock. Shots were fired on 
both sides; many believed that the customhouse officers fired first. The 
customs officers fired “cut shot,” ordinary musket balls scored to break 
apart for a nonlethal, shotgun-like effect, while the smugglers fired regu­
lar musket balls. The cut shot wounded a smuggler, and the smugglers’ 
musket balls killed the customhouse officer, Lazaro Bogdomovitch.
Who was Lazaro Bogdomovitch? The sources are less than satisfac­
tory, but it is known that he was a foreigner. The local Federalist newspa­
per described him as a renegade arsonist and deserter from Napoleons 
armies. Hook described him as Italian, others as Portuguese. The news­
paper accounts further stated that Bogdomovitch had no relatives in the 
area. Probably he was a drifter attracted by the promise of working for 
Hook at the generous rate of two dollars per day As a foreigner, he 
would not have hesitated to enforce the embargo. Furthermore, Bogdo­
movitch apparently had few qualms about using violence; he was over­
heard making threats to kill those who wanted to rescue the contraband 
flour in the days before his murder. Finally, painted in the press as a for­
eigner, a criminal, a deserter from the army of the hated Napoleon, and 
prone to violence, Bogdomovitch could not have been a less sympathetic 
victim.'1
The smugglers’ treatment of Bogdomovitch contrasted strongly with
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their actions toward the other customs guards on Isle au Haut. After the 
skirmish they dragged Bagdomovitch's corpse into the water and set it 
adrift, perhaps as a further insult to the man, or as an attempt to hide the 
body, or both. They took another customs officer prisoner but released 
him after taking his weapon and the remaining two guards fled into the 
darkness. Meanwhile, the crew of the Peggy collected and secured all the 
small craft on the island so that no one could slip away for help, and Wil­
son remained a prisoner on board the Peggy. All in all, minimal force had 
been used, with the curious exception of Bogdomovitch.31
Unfortunately for the smugglers, the two escaped guards found a 
boat on the other side of the island. They went to Castine and informed 
Collector Hook of the skirmish. He immediately called for a posse. Thir­
teen men joined the collector on the schooner he used as a revenue cut­
ter and four men followed in a small sail boat. Despite a “violent gale of 
wind,” the two vessels immediately sailed for Isle au Haut. The small sail­
boat never made it. The boat, and the four men aboard it, simply van­
ished, presumably lost at sea.32 The collector's schooner arrived safely at 
Isle au Haut, but too late; the Peggy had already loaded the provisions 
and left. The collector pursued and found the Peggy at anchor in Fox Is­
land Thoroughfare. Spying the cutter, the smugglers slipped the 
schooner's cable and crowded on sail in an attempt to escape. As the rev­
enue cutter gained on the Peggy the smugglers hoisted a British flag to 
deter their pursuers but to no avail. The cutter overtook them, and the 
Peggy surrendered without further resistance.
Collector Hook took his prisoners to the Hancock County jail in Cas­
tine. Because the federal government had no homicide statute, the pris­
oners were interned at the county's expense on a charge of murder. The 
incident excited enough controversy that Hancock County officials 
posted two additional guards at the jail. Collector Hook then departed to 
attend federal court in Portland. During his absence, more shipping fled 
the Penobscot, and more gunfire was exchanged. On November 15, the 
collector's assistant, alarmed by the violence, wrote an urgent plea for 
help to the commanders of any naval vessel that happened to be near. 
The urgency of the letter is clear. Addressing “the commanders of the 
U.S. ship Chesapeake, ship Wasp, or brig Argus” the collector wrote: “I 
have to request that you will have the goodness to send some force to this 
district immediately, if it is in your power— every means is now used in 
this district to violate the Embargo laws by the opposers of government. 
The lives of those employed by the Collector are now in imminent dan­
ger” In response, the Navy dispatched USS Argus to Penobscot Bay.33
Meanwhile the eight prisoners on murder charges languished in jail.
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Some were sick, and one was wounded by cut shot. Their stay however 
was interrupted on Tuesday, December 13. At two o’clock in the morn­
ing, a heavily armed mob disguised as women descended upon the jail. 
They entered the jailhouse and demanded the keys from the assistant 
jailer who had little choice in the matter. The mob then unlocked the cell 
doors. Four of the prisoners escaped, but two guards arrived in time to 
prevent the remaining four from leaving. The escapees were never seen 
again, and the remaining prisoners were fitted with shackles to await 
trial in June.'*
In the aftermath of the jail break Collector Hook suffered severe 
blows to his authority. The master of the local revenue cutter became so 
alarmed at the proliferation of violence that he disarmed his vessel. Col­
lector Hook’s response is unrecorded, but it happened just after he sent 
his brother to Boston to buy more weapons. One newspaper raged that 
the collector’s brother was “purchasing arms to butcher these unhappy 
sufferers if they do not tamely submit to this infernal usurpation [the 
embargo).” No doubt the collector was as determined as ever, and the 
captain’s actions must have displeased him. The response of the commu­
nity, however, was entirely different. In a town meeting Castine thanked 
the captain for his “manly and patriotic conduct in withdrawing his guns 
from the cutter.” When the court tried the remaining four prisoners in
Hancock County Sheriff George Ulmer’s House in Lincolnville. 
Photograph circa 1900. Courtesy Lincolnville Historical Society.
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John McMasters paid dearly for his role in the Peggy incident. He spent his 
remaining years in Wiscasset’s Lincoln County jail because of his inability 
to pay the fine resulting from his smuggling conviction. Lincoln County jail and 
prisonkeeper’s house, Wiscasset. Photograph circa 1900.
Courtesy Lincoln County Historical Association.
June, no witnesses came forward, and the smugglers were released on a 
plea of “ignoramus.”35
Federal court had more success. The court impounded the Peggy and, 
in March, auctioned the schooner and its cargo of flour and rice. The 
proceeds of the auction were split between the federal government and 
Collector Hook.36 The federal courts also successfully prosecuted the or­
ganizers of the Peggy incident. Andrew Webster, a Castine physician and 
deputy sheriff, went to trial in March 1809, was found guilty and fined 
$2500. Unable to pay the fine, the federal court placed Webster in the 
Castine jail as a debtor but not for long. Four days after internment, 
Webster “broke goal.” As a former deputy sheriff, Webster must have 
been quite familiar with the building; he broke a hole in the plaster ceil­
ing of the second floor debtor’s chamber, crawled into the garret, and, 
using a bed cord, reached the ground through a scuttle in the jail’s root. 
Webster escaped to Nova Scotia, where he married and lived for the rest 
of his life.37
The federal courts had more luck in prosecuting the principal organ­
izer of the Peggy incident, John McMasters, a merchant heavily involved
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Communications.
Another *" Cat out of the Bag."
in smuggling. McMasters was a slippery character. In various documents 
he claimed to have resided in Castine, Bucksport, and Eastport in Maine; 
Boston, Massachusetts; and Halifax, Nova Scotia. Even before the Peggy 
incident, federal officials discovered that McMasters was involved in 
smuggling at Eastport. McMasters went to trial in September 1809, when 
a jury found him guilty of breaking the embargo laws and fined him 
$10,000. Unable to pay this staggering fine, McMasters went to the Lin­
coln County jail in Wiscasset for debt. There he stayed for years, unable 
to pay, and petitioning Congress several times for release. Congress ig­
nored his pleas, and McMasters was still confined in Wiscasset when he 
was killed by a drunken sailor in August 1815.38
The Peggy incident created political repercussions as well. Andrew 
Webster was a Republican, and his detection, trial, and escape did noth­
ing to improve local Federal­
ists’ image of the Republican 
Party. It also proved ex­
tremely awkward to Sheriff 
George Ulmer, Hancock 
County’s leading Republican.
When Webster escaped, Ul­
mer faced the embarrassment 
of being sued by the Federal 
government, which held him 
personally responsible as 
sheriff for the prisoners in the 
Hancock County jail.39
In addition to the federal 
suit, Ulmer’s efforts to sup­
port the embargo also proved 
to be personally and politi­
cally embarrassing for him.
When a handful of Hancock 
County Republicans under 
Ulmer’s leadership attempted 
to inform the press that 
the entire county supported 
the embargo laws and Presi­
dent Jefferson, a Lincolnville 
countermeeting assembled 
under the leadership of the 
sheriff’s own brother. The
JO SEPH  T Y L E R , Esq. of Deer Isle
the gentleman to whom the following letter 
was directed has been a Republican and 
advocated the measures and pot icy of the 
Jeffersonian Administration, until it became 
evident that the government were guilty of 
duplicity in their negociations with Foreign 
Nations ;  that they had been in constant 
practice of bolding a language confidential 
and at the same time, a language totally 
different as official. Pretending to act 
with impartiality to all nations  and endea­
vouring by publishing the most barefaced 
falsehoods, to deceive the People,  as to the 
true cause for which the Embargo was 
most wantonly and wickedly laid, and his 
continued to be enforced y that Kc became 
di/gufted with their coudud, and Hath long 
Cldcc abandoned the party, coafideong them 
tbiaum m  wf omr ComUry mU L d trty.
l w + uu, 6a, ifo f  
Jo u r s  T n r 4 ,  ET4-
It U truly •nfbrtsdslt tbs* you RrpabJicioj <4p 
DMf.Iflc.did Dot voic for Judge Cook, loQesd of 
Malar Oaooctt. It aodotrs to me ihit von did
Anti-embargo letters such as this one, 
“Another ‘Cat out of the Bag'” published in 
the Gazette of Maine, March 25, 1809, gloated 
over prominent Maine merchants' abandon­
ment of the Jeffersonian Republicans.
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countermeeting ridiculed Ulmer’s attempt, pointing out that his meet­
ing was attended by less than twenty men, among them several custom 
house officers. Notably, Samuel Whitney, the revenue cutter captain who 
had disarmed his vessel, attended the countermeeting. Clearly custom 
house authorities were now drifting away from the embargo and con­
forming to community standards. Ulmer grumbled to a fellow Republi­
can: “There really is a want of patriotic firmness among the common 
people.” Meanwhile Ulmer’s carefully constructed Republican network 
began to unravel. Many formerly staunch Jeffersonians abandoned the 
party because they now associated Jeffersonian politics with the em­
bargo/"
In the aftermath of the Peggy incident, customs officers who did not 
act within the community norms continued to be the targets of violence. 
In April 1809, Deer Isle’s first selectman assaulted a customs officer. In 
the words of the Lincolnville countermeeting, the officers of the federal 
government had “abused that confidence we have heretofore with pride 
and pleasure placed in them.” Port towns now looked to the Massachu­
setts General Court to supply relief from the “oppressive” national gov­
ernment.41 The legitimacy of the Republican Party and its policies nearly 
self-destructed. Lucky for the party, Republican activists such as William 
King were able to seize on an issue that resonated with much of Maine’s 
population: squatter’s rights. With the murder of Paul Chadwick in 
Malta in September 1809, the issue of squatter’s rights became all the 
more compelling. The murder of Bogdomovitch and Chadwick both 
reflected the tensions that were bitterly dividing Maine communities.
The embargo ended before the collective action in Penobscot Bay be­
came the political action of Massachusetts as a whole. Many had pre­
dicted civil war if the laws continued to be enforced. Something had to 
give way, and it was the will of Thomas Jefferson that had to conform to 
economic realities. A few days before leaving office, President Jefferson 
signed a bill repealing the unpopular commercial restrictions. Although 
the laws that followed still limited trade, they were not as devastating as 
the embargo laws. Nevertheless, smuggling remained rampant under the 
new nonintercourse laws until at least 1815.
There are several conclusions to be drawn from extralegal resistance 
to the embargo laws. The first is that Maine’s coastal populace felt they 
had a moral right to engage in maritime commerce. This conviction was 
based on the resources available, their interpretation of the Constitution, 
and established custom. The second conclusion is that embargo violators 
were not acting as individuals. Smuggling, by definition, is a crime that 
requires the acquiescence of a substantial portion of a community. Gov­
ernment attempted to prosecute smugglers as individuals, a tactic that 
met with little success when society did not view smugglers as criminals. 
The collective violence of embargo violators was an expression of com­
munity will; they viewed the customhouse officers, not themselves, as 
the transgressors. Third, the collective violence of the embargo resisters 
was an expression of moral economy. While moral economy most often 
espoused a negative view of commerce, it also represented a judgment 
about how a market economy should serve the community. In this case, 
a cessation of commerce was lethal to a community with an extractive 
economy. While the embargo had a negative impact on the merchants, 
the effect was far more devastating on the lower strata of society. As a re­
sult, the officials who enforced a cessation of commerce became viewed 
as oppressors, and targets of the community's wrath.
Finally, one should consider the scale of effort required by the federal 
government to enforce the embargo laws. Every available resource was 
strained to the utmost, yet the national government failed to impose its 
will on the tiny communities of coastal Maine. The Jeffersonians were 
slow to appreciate the strength of the commercial instinct. Once again, it 
was William King who realized that power. Just as he used the squatter 
issue to rescue the Republican cause, he used the issue of seaborne com­
merce to argue for the separation of Maine from Massachusetts. By ma­
nipulating a change in coasting laws, he persuaded coastal residents that 
statehood would not harm their commercial interests. In Alan Taylors 
study of agrarian resistance, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors, King ap­
pears primarily as the benefactor of agrarian squatters, but it was his 
courtship of Maine's coastal populace that brought statehood to Maine.4' 
Seaborne commerce, the key to Maine's economy, wedded the region to 
a market economy very early in its history. That adherence to commerce, 
however, did not mean that coastal communities necessarily believed in 
the principles of economic rationalism or abandoned communal values.
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came to Penobscot Bay remains a mystery, but he was probably an unem­
ployed sailor hired by the federal government to guard a cargo of contra­
band from being retaken by smugglers.
2. Neither George Augustus Wheelers History ofCastine, Penobscot, and 
Brooksville, Maine (Bangor: Burr & Robinson, 1875) nor the standard his­
tory for the early settlement of Isle au Haut, George L. Hosmer's An Histori­
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